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Abstract: Internal conflicts entail large asset losses for certain segments in the 
civilian population. Asset losses may compromise the future welfare of 
households, thus leaving a legacy of structural poverty that is difficult to 
overcome. The purpose of this article is to analyze how asset losses occur 
during internal conflicts and the process of asset accumulation following the 
initial shock. To do this, we concentrate on a particularly vulnerable group of 
victims of war—the displaced population in Colombia. In achieving our 
objective, we adopt quantitative and qualitative approaches by: (i) providing a 
detailed description of losses stemming from forced displacement; (ii) analyzing 
qualitative evidence so as to understand the asset recovery processes for the 
displaced population; and (iii) estimating OLS, Instrumental Variable and 
quartile regressions in order to identify the determinants of asset losses 
stemming from forced displacement, and asset accumulation following the 
initial shock. The results indicate that recuperating asset losses or accumulating 
new assets is a rare event; only 25 percent of households are able to recover 
their original asset base, while asset ownership still seems insufficient for 
overcoming poverty. In addition, displaced households do not catch up even as 
settlement at destination sites consolidates. Therefore, unless a positive 
intervention is implemented, displaced households become locked in a low 
income trajectory, and are unlikely to leap forward to a high return asset level.  
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Introduction 
Internal conflicts may entail large asset losses for certain segments of the civilian 
population. During internal conflicts, the main victims of war are civilians, who are 
targeted by armed groups seeking to consolidate territorial strongholds, expand 
territorial control, and seize valuable resources (Azam and Hoefler, 2002). Physical 
assets are destroyed, abandoned or seized illegally by armed groups (Matowu and 
Stewart, 2001; and Brück, 2004); financial markets may be disrupted by war activities, 
and access for particular households may become difficult; and informal risk sharing 
mechanism are generally undermined. Therefore, losses of physical, financial, social 
and human capital are substantial. 
Assets losses may compromise the future welfare of households. By contributing to the 
generating of income and acting as insurance mechanisms, assets are important 
determinants of the present and future welfare of households (Little et al, 2006; Helme 
and Shepherd, 2003; Fafchamps et al, 1998; Rosenzweig, and Woping, 1993; and 
Corbett, 1988). When some groups of the population are rationed out of credit markets, 
asset depletion or an insufficient asset base forces households into a low yield trajectory 
and into poverty traps (Carter and Barret, 2006; Reardon and Vosti, 1995; Rosenzweig 
and Binswanger, 1993). 
As a result, internal conflicts may leave a legacy of structural poverty that is difficult to 
overcome. Recovering assets after a shock is seldom likely for households located at the 
lower end of the income distribution, and the negative conditions generated by conflict 
only serve to aggravate this situation. In addition to the loss of physical assets, victims 
of conflicts face the possible death of household members, restrictions with respect to 
financial markets, the destruction of social networks, and often insurmountable 
obstacles to entry into urban labor markets. Active public action aimed at restoring 
households to previous levels and stimulating growth are consequently required as a 
component of post-conflict reconstruction.  
The purpose of this article is to analyze how asset losses occur during internal conflicts 
and the process of asset accumulation following conflict induced shocks. In order to 
achieve this objective, we concentrate on a particularly vulnerable group of victims of 
war—the displaced population in Colombia. Three questions are examined. First, we 
seek to understand the process and magnitude of asset losses caused by internal conflict.   3
Second, we explore the extent to which the dynamics of the conflict and the purposive 
targeting by armed groups to some groups of the population determine the magnitude of 
assets losses from forced displacement. Third, we investigate the process of asset 
recovery by identifying who is better able to accumulate new assets. In addressing these 
questions, we rely on households surveys of 2,322 displaced Colombian households and 
qualitative studies conducted for the World Bank’s ‘Moving Out of Poverty’ Study.  
The structure of this article is as follows. In the second section we examine the 
economic literature for the purposes of understanding how asset holdings shape 
economic welfare; explaining how households adopt strategies to accumulate and 
protect assets; and describing how a lack of assets creates poverty traps. The model, 
qualitative and quantitative data, and results are presented in section three. Section four 
concludes.  
1.  Literature review 
Standard microeconomic models predict that, in the presence of decreasing returns on 
assets, poor households eventually catch up with wealthier households with respect to 
their welfare trajectories. Nevertheless, locally increasing returns or exclusionary 
mechanisms—such as imperfect credit markets—may hinder convergence, and multiple 
equilibria may arise, thus restricting some groups to low income trajectories. Inasmuch 
as investments are lower due to credit market imperfections, investment indivisibilities 
or behavioral components,
4 some economic agents prove unable to accumulate 
sufficient asset holdings so as to surpass critical thresholds and thus reach a higher 
economic trajectory (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Durlauf, 1992; Mookherjee and Ray, 2002; 
and Carter and Barret, 2006). Initial wealth conditions become a strong predictor of the 
economic performance of households, resulting in divergences in economic trajectories.  
Structural poverty, then, strongly correlates with initial conditions, like an insufficient 
asset base. As returns on small asset holdings are insufficient, income barely covers 
subsistence needs; consequently, there is a negligible surplus to save. Although credit is 
an alternative mechanism for accumulating assets and thus crossing the critical 
threshold for moving out of poverty, access to credits is often restricted for low income 
households; this is even more so in developing countries. Sacrificing short-term 
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consumption in order to build up an asset base is also difficult to adopt when a 
household is close to subsistence consumption levels. These constraints may push 
households into poverty traps (Carter and Barret, 2006; Reardon and Vosti, 1995; and 
Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993), as initial asset inequalities tend to reproduce and 
deepen themselves over time (Zimmermann and Carter, 2003). 
Aside from determining the ability of households to generate income, assets are an 
important insurance mechanism for coping with shocks (Little et al, 2006). As a 
precautionary measure, households accumulate non-productive assets, which may easily 
be liquidated when shocks arise (Helme and Shepherd, 2003; Fafchamps et al, 1998; 
Rosenzweig and Woping, 1993; and Corbett, 1988). Other assets, such as land, play an 
important productive role even while they remain non-liquid (Corbett, 1988); when 
shocks occur, households rely on non-productive assets while simultaneously protecting 
productive assets. The latter is only sold if conditions become extremely harsh, and it is 
necessary in order not to compromise long-term consumption and welfare (Corbett, 
1988). 
Consequently, households usually adopt several strategies to prevent disposing of 
productive assets during times of crisis. If access to credit markets and insurance 
mechanisms is complete, households can protect their assets, and shocks do not 
necessarily translate into asset depletion (Carter and Barret, 2006). However, credit 
markets often ration out low income households and insurance mechanisms are not able 
to completely reduce income risks (Townsend, 1994; Ligon et al, 2001; Foster and 
Rosenzweig, 2001; and Fafchamps and Gulbert, 2006). As a result, households are often 
compelled to adopt other strategies for protecting assets. A common strategy is to 
sacrifice short-term consumption in order to avoid the distress sale of assets; households 
prefer to smooth assets instead of consumption (Carter and Barret, 2006; Hoddinott, 
2006; Barret et al, 2004; and Zimmermann and Carter, 2003). Where risks are high, 
households may cut back consumption in order to protect assets and future 
consumption, while being careful not to fall below subsistence levels, whereby 
consumption therefore is extremely volatile (Barret and McPeak, 2006). In fact, 
households tend first to adopt reversible strategies; as options for mitigating risk 
become exhausted, strategies which may compromise future consumption—such as 
forced migration and the sale of land sales—are adopted (Corbett, 1988).   5
Poor households, however, have limited alternatives for protecting assets, which leaves 
them ill equipped to cope with shocks and thus highly prone to falling into poverty 
traps. On the one hand, poor households are near subsistence consumption levels to 
begin with; reducing consumption then in order to build up an asset base hardly 
constitutes an alternative (Barret et al, 2004). Moreover, immediate reductions in 
consumption may imply long-term costs such as school interruption, drops in nutritional 
status and reductions in human capital investment, all of which would most likely 
compromise future consumption (Carter and Barret, 2006; Jensen, 2000; Jacoby and 
Skoufias, 1997; Foster, 1995; Behrman, 1988; and Corbett, 1988). By reducing human 
capital, depleting physical capital, and/or destroying social capital, shocks may push 
households into poverty traps. If shocks lead to irreversible asset loss or persist from 
one period to the next, the negative consequences may become permanent and income 
may fall below the critical wealth threshold for several periods (Hoddinott, 2006; and 
Dercon, 1998). 
Empirical evidence indicates that structural poverty is strongly related to a lack of 
assets. Longitudinal studies and qualitative evidence show that structural poverty is 
frequently related to asset deprivation, whereas the existence of a solid asset base is a 
strong determinant of upward mobility (Krishna et al, 2006; Adato et al, 2006; Barrett et 
al, 2004; Little et al, 2006; Hulme and Shepherd, 2003; Barrientos and Shepherd, 2003; 
Sen, 2003; and Carter and May, 1999). In fact, assets are a fundamental mobility 
mechanism for overcoming poverty when unemployment rates are high and labor 
markets are restricted (Hulme y Shepherd, 2003). 
Socio-demographic characteristics, human and social capital, labor markets, and shocks 
are also related to structural poverty. By providing support for finding a job, capital for 
productive activities, and assistance to mitigate crises, social capital facilitates 
movement out of poverty (Adato et al, 2006; Barrett et al, 2004; and Little et al, 2006). 
Human capital, paired with access to labor markets, is also an important mechanism for 
moving ahead, particularly where asset holdings are low.  Where assets are lacking, the 
poor have to rely entirely on labor to generate income and accumulate assets. Moreover, 
investment in human capital allows people to move from low productivity (and low 
paying) jobs to high productivity jobs, thus creating a virtuous cycle (Adato et al, 2006; 
Krishna et al, 2006; Barret and McPeak, 2006; Barret et al, 2004; and Sen, 2003). 
Lastly, the empirical evidence identifies large shocks as determinants of downward   6
mobility and structural poverty. The death of wage earners, serious illnesses, famines 
and civil conflict may push household into structural poverty if proper aid is not 
provided to the victims (Adato et al, 2006, Hulme and Shepherd, 2003; and Corbett, 
1988).  
During periods of internal conflict or civil strife, illegal appropriation, the destruction, 
erosion, and depletion of assets are widespread, generally laying down a legacy of 
structural poverty for a considerable segment of the population, which, in turn, may sow 
the seeds of future conflicts. First, armed groups seize assets from the civilian 
population in order to finance the war and weaken their opponents’ support among the 
population (Hirshleifer, 2001). Added to this, although conflicts may have erupted as a 
consequence of specific grievances, the duration and sustainability of the conflict is 
greatly determined by the capacity of armed groups to extract rents and appropriate 
valuable assets from the civilian population. Consequently, the loss of physical capital, 
especially land, during conflicts is sometimes substantial (Engel and Ibáñez, 2007; 
Matowu and Stewart and, 2001; and André and Platteau 1998). Second, since the 
civilian population becomes the target of armed groups, household disintegration, 
caused by death and forced recruitment, is common; this leads to large losses in human 
capital. In addition, since some households are forced to migrate from urban to rural 
areas, returns on their human capital, - namely a knowledge of agricultural production—
deteriorates significantly. Third, conflicts severely disrupt formal and informal risk-
sharing mechanisms; access to financial markets decreases, informal lending drops, and 
links to social networks are weakened (Ibáñez y Moya, 2006a). Consequently, the 
victims of internal conflict are more likely to fall into chronic poverty (Justino and 
Verwimp, 2006). 
3. Empirical Analysis  
The purpose of this section is to understand how a severe shock, namely internal 
conflict and forced displacement, causes substantial asset loss, and how households are 
able to recover from this shock. We adopt both quantitative and qualitative approaches 
in order to achieve our objective by: (i) providing a detailed description of the losses 
stemming from forced displacement; (ii) analyzing qualitative evidence which enables 
us to understand the complex process by which a displaced population recovers it 
assets; and (iii) estimating OLS, Instrumental Variable and quartile regressions so as to   7
identify the determinants of asset losses as a consequence of displacement, and asset 
accumulation after displacement. This section presents a short description of the internal 
conflict in Colombia, the analytical framework on which we base our research, our data, 
and the empirical results of our study.  
3.1. Internal conflict and forced displacement in Colombia 
Since its independence from Spanish rule, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
Colombia has been marred by several internal conflicts which have seen various groups 
struggle for the control of political institutions, land, and resources. These conflicts have 
progressively exerted a heavy toll on the civilian population. In particular, two conflicts 
that arose during the second half of the twentieth century targeted and inflicted 
significant losses on civilians.  
The first conflict, known as La Violencia, emerged from the political struggle between 
the two traditional and major political parties in Colombia, the Liberals and 
Conservatives. La Violencia exploded vigorously in 1948, following the assassination 
of a major political leader of the Liberal Party, an individual who enjoyed massive 
popular support. Riots immediately took place in Bogotá, the country’s capital. From 
there, the violence between the followers of the two parties quickly spread to rural 
areas. Homicide rates soared throughout this period as people were chased and 
murdered on account of their political affiliation; official figures estimate that nearly 
30,000 persons lost their lives during this period of civil strife (Echeverry et al, 2001). 
After 10 years of bloodshed between Liberals and Conservatives, an exclusive power-
sharing arrangement between both parties, initiated in 1958, paved the way for a peace 
deal, one which finally brought the armed confrontations to an end.  
Even though the level of violence lessened over the subsequent two decades, the 
agreement did not bring the civil conflict to an end. Quite the contrary, with the 
emergence of several left wing guerrilla groups—the FARC, ELN and ERP—the 
conflict was only transformed. These groups emerged during the early-sixties, in the 
southern region of the country, and quickly began launching sporadic attacks on 
government forces and occupying rural towns and lands; they sought to contest the rule 
of the Liberal and Conservative Parties and overthrow the government (Echeverry et al, 
2001).   8
The violence from guerrilla groups intensified in the late-seventies and early-eighties 
with the appearance of illegal marihuana and coca drug crops. The illicit drug trade 
provided massive resources to rebel groups, and has served to fuel the conflict ever 
since. These resources also instigated the creation of right-wing paramilitary groups, 
groups that have been closely related to drug barons and land owners, and which, in 
most regions, have contested the power of guerrilla movements. The emergence of 
paramilitary groups, coupled with resources from the illegal drug trade, has resulted in a 
much more intense and on-going conflict all over the country. (Gaviria, 2000; Thoumi, 
2002).  
Intensification of the conflict has caused an escalating trend of attacks against the 
civilian population and has been the main cause behind forced displacement. 
Aggression directed at the civilian population has been more than simply a fortuitous 
by-product of the violence between guerrillas, paramilitaries and government forces; it 
has constituted an explicit and rational strategy of armed groups for funding activities 
and for consolidating and expanding their territorial strongholds. Forced displacement, 
in particular, has become a widespread strategy for, among other things, weakening the 
enemy’s support among the population, clearing regions for growing and trafficking in 
illegal crops, and expropriating lands and resources (Engel and Ibáñez, 2007). At the 
present time, forced displacement is affecting more than 2.5 million people, which 
corresponds to 5.7 percent of Colombia’s population; a figure that stands out worldwide 
(Ibáñez et al, 2006). Moreover, as illegal armed groups are pervasive throughout 
Colombia, nearly 90 percent of all municipalities have either faced expulsion or have 
been the recipient of displaced persons. 
Left-wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitary groups are accountable for most of the 
forced migration in Colombia. As of December 2005, guerrillas and paramilitary groups 
have been responsible for 47 percent and 17 percent of all displacement events, 
respectively (Ibáñez et al, 2006). These groups rely on violent aggression, inclusive of 
such as death threats, massacres, selective homicides, kidnapping and forced 
recruitment, among others, in order to force the migration of civilians. Contrary to what 
happens in other countries, massive displacement—whereby several households from 
the same community or town migrate at the same time—is the exception rather than the   9
rule in Colombia. Nearly 76.1 percent of displaced persons migrated individually while 
only 23.7 percent of them migrated as part of a larger group (massively).
5  
Forced migration results in a sudden and considerable loss of physical, human, social 
and financial capital. Because households are forced to migrate unexpectedly and 
hastily,  the protection, carrying, or selling of assets prior to migration is rare. 
Consequently, physical capital losses can prove substantial—while some owners are 
compelled to sell their land and properties at a lower price than the market value, others 
are forced to simply abandon them; only a few are able to sell them at market value. 
Physical assets are seldom converted into liquid capital, such as might later be invested 
at destination sites for the purpose of initiating other productive activities.  
Furthermore, the dynamics of forced migration cause a depreciation in the human 
capital of displaced persons. Assassination, forced recruitment, and the disappearance of 
household members are among the main triggers of displacement; all entail the loss of 
members who might otherwise generate income. Added to this, physical incapacity as a 
consequence of conflict (e.g., victims of land mines) and post-traumatic stress disorder 
often pose tremendous psychological stress on households, thus preventing surviving 
victims from recovering from the shock of displacement and coping with 
responsibilities. Finally, since the majority of households migrate from rural areas and 
prior to displacement used to work in agriculture, returns from human capital drop 
inasmuch as their competiveness in the urban labor market is relatively low. 
Financial and social capital losses are also noteworthy. By facing substantial constraints 
in terms of generating income, households often fail to honor loan agreements, thus 
losing future access to credit markets. In any event, the loss of physical assets generally 
means that most displaced households lack the collateral necessary for applying for 
formal credit. Lastly, social capital also deteriorates, as pre-displacement links to social 
networks at sites of origins are weakened, and many households disintegrate. 
Conversely, the level of access to social networks and local leaders at destination sites is 
relatively low.  
Displaced households are unable to make up for asset losses by generating larger 
incomes at destination sites. First, displaced persons find considerable obstacles to 
accessing urban labor markets; given what are often high unemployment rates and the 
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absence of a good match between working experience and urban labor market 
requirements, urban areas generally absorb newcomers only slowly. Second, a lack of 
assets and the rationing of credit markets, on the other hand, obstruct engagement in 
productive activities at destination sites.  
The loss of physical, human, financial and social capital pushes displaced households 
into extremely vulnerable conditions. Forced displacement reduces the possiblity of 
generating income and severely restricts risk-insurance mechanisms, thus potentially 
helping to create poverty traps for a segment of the Colombian population. In fact, 
empirical evidence identifies forced displacement as one of the catastrophic events that 
generates structural poverty (Hulme y Shepherd, 2003).  
3.2. Assets losses and asset accumulation: a simple reduced form model to identify the 
determinants 
Households’ socioeconomic status at the municipality of origin, the process and 
characteristics underlying forced migration, the distance to the municipality of origin, 
the capacity to control assets, access to financial and labor markets, level of 
participation in income generating programs, and overall vulnerability seem to 
constitute important factors that have an effect on displaced households’ asset 
dynamics. In order to control for different household characteristics, while at the same 
time understanding the effect and importance of each on asset dynamics, we develop an 
econometrical analysis. The models we present in this section hypothesize the possible 
determinants of displaced households’ asset dynamics and explain how each 
determinant influences the situation. We examine first the process of assets losses 
stemming from forced displacement and how the dynamics of conflict determine these 
losses. Second, we identify the determinants of asset accumulation once the forcefully 
displaced settle in destination. By investigating assets losses and asset accumulation, we 
provide evidence on the impact of internal conflict upon asset trajectories, and the 
ability of households to recover from conflict related shocks. 
Displaced household’s asset dynamics are described by two different factors: the value 
of assets at the municipality of origin that were abandoned following displacement 
( L A ); and the value of the asset base at the receiving municipality ( R A ). Each of these 
is influenced by different factors. Assets losses are driven by the dynamics of the 
internal conflict in the region of origin, the victimization process households endured   11
before displacing, and the strategies adopted to minimize asset loss. Asset accumulation 
in destination, on the other hand, is determined by the income generation capacity of 
households, their vulnerability conditions, participation in programs to support the 
displaced population, and the settlement process in destination. 
We will discuss first the determinants of asset losses ( L A ). The conflict dynamics that 
triggered forced migration are strongly linked to asset loss. For example, since armed 
groups need to fund their operations, the presence of illegal armed groups () I P  at sites 
of origin frequently results in asset seizure and thus abandonment. Conversely, presence 
of government forces () G P  may protect households from illegal groups’ attacks, 
reducing the likelihood of being forced to move and of loosing assets.  
The victimization profile of households may determine the extent of asset losses. Illegal 
groups purposively target some households to terrorize the civil population, and prompt 
displacement. These households are therefore victims of selective homicides, forced 
recruitments, and death threats, among others. When household members are forced to 
flee hastily in order to save their lives or after being the victims of such events (reactive 
displacement() Re ), the possibility of protecting assets becomes scant. On the other 
hand, when households migrate preventively out of fear that the conflict will escalate in 
the region, it becomes easier to plan the migration. Consequently, protecting, selling or 
transferring assets to family or friends is more likely; likewise, to control assets at origin 
municipalities. Such direct attacks sometimes imply the death or disappearance of 
family members, usually the main breadwinners, who in the case of rural households are 
frequently male members () PP . Since land titles are generally registered to male 
household heads and informal marital unions are widespread in Colombian rural areas 
Meertens (2005), households that lose the main breadwinner have difficulties 
recovering land. These households may face substantial asset losses. 
Attacks to groups of the civil population are not random. Certain groups are deliberately 
targeted as a war strategy. Community leaders or households with strong social 
networks  () O CS  are more likely to be targeted by armed groups. The attacks of illegal 
armed groups are usually aimed at community leaders in order to frighten the civilian 
population, weaken their enemy’s popular support, and discourage civil resistance.   
Notwithstanding, social networks can be effective mechanisms for some households to   12
control assets and exploit land plots following displacement. Consequently, the impact 
of social capital on asset losses is uncertain. Land owners and tenants () L  are also 
attractive targets for armed groups as, once they flee, lands are abandoned and can be 
seized by armed groups. Incentive to attack land owners increases as land plots are 
larger, yet large landowners are better able to adopt strategies to protect their assets. 
Young men are potential combatants that may be forced to join armed groups. Thus, the 
age structure of the household () S  may also prompt attacks from armed groups. Direct 
attacks undermine a household’s ability to protect its assets; thus, households with high 
levels of social capital, access to land, or with young males, may face large asset losses.  
Lastly, belonging to an ethnic minority ( ) Me , such as indigenous or Afro-Colombian 
groups, may also determine the extent of asset losses, but the effect is difficult to 
establish a priori. Ethnic minorities suffer direct attacks from armed groups with greater 
frequency; hence, these households face larger obstacles when trying to control assets at 
origin sites following displacement.  Ethnic minorities, however, usually possess 
collective land titles, which may help to protect them against illegal land seizures by 
armed groups.  
Households are not however passive victims of the armed conflict. Some households 
may adopt strategies to minimize the extent of asset losses. Relocating within the 
municipality is a migration strategy sometimes employed to protect and/or recover 
assets. Households may decide to migrate within the municipality (M) in order to 
maintain control over their productive assets, continue with productive activities at their 
land plots, and extract rents. By residing closer to their land plots, for instance, 
households that migrate within a municipality are better able to control their assets at 
sites of origin. In order to protect land plots after displacement, households may decide 
to register their title in official records (F). Legal title over land plots may prove as an 
obstacle for illegal seizure, preventing thus attacks from armed groups or protecting 
land once forced displacement occurs. Notwithstanding, legal title may be ineffective in 
regions where the rule of law and the protection of property rights is lacking, which is 
usually the case in conflict driven regions. Human capital, ( ) H , constitutes an element 
allowing households to device strategies to protect assets prior to migration. Better 
educated individuals may design effective strategies for protecting assets at origin sites, 
selling them prior to migration, and/or controlling them at destination sites. On the other 
hand, better educated individuals may become effective community leaders posing a   13
threat to armed groups which may seek to dissolve any civil resistance. Thus, the impact 
of human capital on asset losses is uncertain. 
The determinants of asset losses are then defined by the following reduced form 
() F M S L CS PP R P P A A o e G I L L , , , , , , , , = . 
Asset accumulation in destination sites is driven by different factors than those that 
shape asset losses. First, length of settlement in destination sites, () T ,  may exert a 
positive or negative influence on asset accumulation. As households become settled for 
longer periods of time at destination sites, knowledge about the labor market increases 
and economic opportunities broaden, thus increasing the likelihood of recovering 
productive paths and accumulating new assets at receiving municipalities. As the time 
of settlement increases, however, governmental aid programs come to an end, and the 
short-term benefits of income generating programs vanish. If the first effect exceeds the 
second effects—this is, if a household’s ability to recover productive capacity offsets 
the discontinuation of resources from aid programs—time of settlement will exert a 
positive effect on asset dynamics. Such may be the case when households are able to 
adapt themselves adequately to the conditions at receiving municipalities, and/or when 
aid programs produce long-term benefits. On the opposite side, if the second is stronger 
than the first one, then the effect of the time of settlement on asset dynamics will be 
negative. Such might be the case for households that were not suited for adapting to 
receiving municipalities.    
Human capital, () H ,  may contribute to adapt easier to conditions at destination sites, 
thus improving asset accumulation following displacement. Higher levels of human 
capital may be fundamental to competing in urban labor markets and finding alternative 
sources of income, both of which help households to accumulate new assets. However, 
human capital is not necessarily a transferable asset. Agricultural experience () Ag  is 
not useful in urban labor markets, where the predominant occupations for low-skilled 
workers are in construction, services or petty trade. This depreciation of human capital 
restricts earning possibilities and, consequently, asset accumulation. 
The ability to generate income, in particular through access to labor markets, extraction 
of rents from assets left in their hometown and social capital, are crucial in promoting 
the accumulation of asset holdings. Access to labor markets and successful small   14
enterprises are key determinants of the level of success in accumulating assets at 
receiving municipalities. Income earned in labor markets or through small enterprises, 
() R Y , besides covering subsistence needs, may be invested in new productive assets. 
Some households are still able to control assets in their hometown, and extract rents 
from production in their land plots. By obtaining rents from the exploitation of these 
plots, they are able to accumulate new assets at receiving municipalities. Social 
networks and social capital at receiving municipalities, ( ) R CS , among other things, help 
households mitigate shocks, acquire information about aid programs or job 
opportunities, and gain access to special assistance programs and credits. To measure 
the density of social networks at destination sites, we include a dummy variable for 
contacts at the new location and membership in formal organizations. Families and 
friends at reception sites may provide assistance during the first months of 
displacement, help mediate with respect to finding jobs, and provide housing in times of 
crisis, all of which help mitigate displacement shock and increase the likelihood of 
recovering productive capacity. Membership in formal organizations provides a similar 
support, and may help displaced households access special programs for displaced 
persons, or legal aid for recovering lost assets at the municipality of origin.  
Current household structures and socioeconomic characteristics are also determinants of 
displaced households’ asset dynamics. First, income generation and the accumulation of 
assets depend, among other factors, on a household’s structure and the age of the 
household head. High dependency ratios, ( ) D , imply fewer members generating income 
and greater needs, thus restricting the capacity for recovering assets. Female household 
heads,  () J , may also face obstacles to accumulating new assets, due to their 
vulnerability following displacement. Conditions worsen when a female member is 
compelled to fill the role of household head after displacement, usually after the death 
or forced disappearance of the main bread winner. Such households may not be able to 
achieve income levels similar to those attained by male-headed households because of 
high dependency ratios, a lack of labor experience, and the general poor quality of jobs 
that are offered to women. Age, () E , may exhibit an inverted u-shape relationship with 
asset dynamics. Because young displaced persons have less working experience, their 
income is low; consequently, asset recovery becomes difficult. On the other hand, old 
persons may have difficulties learning new occupations and adapting to changing   15
circumstances. Asset accumulation, consequently, increase with age, but only with 
diminishing marginal returns. Lastly, belonging to an ethnic minority may also 
determine asset accumulation as these groups faces particular vulnerabilities given their 
cultural heritage, and language barriers, among others. 
Access to programs targeting the displaced population,  i G , may provide the initial 
stimulus for recovering productive capacity, generating sufficient income, and placing 
households on the path of asset accumulation. The impact of these programs, however, 
differs according to the type of assistance received. Although humanitarian aid, health 
coverage and school enrolment are important programs that improve the conditions of 
displaced households at destination sites, their effectiveness in generating income and 
with respect to accumulating assets is limited, if not inexistent. Conversely, since 
income generating programs promote access to labor markets or investment in 
productive activities, their contribution to income earnings and asset recovery might be 
much more effective. Such programs are thus crucial to helping households generate 
income and accumulate assets. 
Accumulation for asset holdings for household i then is defined as: 
() G Me E PP J D CS Y Ag H T A A R R R R , , , , , , , , , , = . 
The reduced form equations for asset losses stemming from displacement and asset 
accumulation in destination sites are estimated with household surveys applied to 2.322 
household surveys which are described below.  
3.3. The data 
We base our empirical analysis on two sources of data. The first source is a household 
survey that was applied to displaced households in Colombia during 2004 and 2005. 
The second source is qualitative data from the community reports generated by the 
World Bank’s ‘Moving Out of Poverty’ Colombian case study. Both data sources are 
described in the following paragraphs. 
The sample of the household-level data comprises 2,322 displaced households located 
in 48 municipalities
6 and 21 departments. The purpose of the survey was to characterize 
the forced migration process, identify welfare losses caused by displacement, elicit the 
                                                 
6 Municipalities are the smallest administrative units in Colombia. Departments are similar to states in the 
United States.    16
level of desire to return, and evaluate income generating programs. To achieve these 
objectives, we constructed a sample for a treatment group comprised of 769 displaced 
household beneficiaries of income generating programs, and a control group comprised 
of 1,553 displaced households who are non-beneficiaries of income generating 
programs. 
The control group is representative of the displaced population while the treatment 
group is representative of those displaced households which are beneficiaries of income 
generating programs. Given the large mobility and the unwillingness to be located of 
the displaced population, constructing a representative sample of this population is 
difficult. In fact, Colombia thus far does not have a representative sample of the 
displaced population. To build the sample, we could rely on two data sets of displaced 
population. The first data base, RUPD, is the official registry of displaced population 
which contains all displaced households who are beneficiaries of government 
assistance. To register in RUPD, displaced households should actively seek government 
institutions, and present a legal declaration, which is later verified by government 
authorities. Consequently, these registry faces large underegistration due to 
misinformation, and arbitrary decisions from public officials as well as a bias due to the 
registration process (Ibáñez and Velasquez, 2007). Moreover, details about the 
displacement process and household structure from the RUPD data is restricted to a few 
characteristics. The second data base is the RUT System that covers (i) displaced 
households which request assistance in any of the 3,764 parishes of the Catholic 
Church; and  (ii) households which are included by censuses conducted by the Catholic 
Church in many municipalities. A detailed questionnaire is applied to a sample of 
displaced households
7. When the sample was defined, the data  contained information 
from 32,093 households and nearly 150,000 people. Although the RUT system is not 
representative of the displaced population, the detailed questionnaire provided ample 
information to construct a stratified sample. In addition, the fact that is not only 
demand-driven, as the RUPD, makes it more realiable because the bias somehow is 
reduced by not only relying on decisions of households and public officials decisions. 
The design for the control sample was therefore based on the RUT sample.  
                                                 
7 The survey elicits information aimed at identifying the causes of and actors responsible for 
displacement, household characteristics, land tenure status, access to labor markets and the level of 
education before and after displacement, as well as the different needs of displaced persons/households. 
The questionnaire also seeks to gain information regarding participation in organizations and the 
willingness of displaced households to return to respective points of origin.   17
The control sample was divided into two sub-samples to correct for RUT bias: (i) 794 
RUT households; and (ii) 759 non-RUT households. A stratified sample was selected 
from the RUT sample
8; enumerators then proceeded to locate RUT households and 
administer the survey. For each RUT household surveyed, a non-RUT household in the 
general vicinity was located; the survey was then administered to that household. A 
comparison between the RUT sample, the non-RUT and the RUPD sample showed 
differences between the characteristics of the displaced households, and the 
displacement process was not statitistically significant (Ibáñez et al, 2006). 
Beneficiaries of income generating programs were surveyed in the same municipalities 
as contained in the RUT and non-RUT samples. Households were randomly selected 
from a beneficiary list provided by three organizations responsible for implementing 
these programs.  
Enumerators were social workers employed in Catholic parrishes in each municipality. 
Two reasons led us to select workers from the Catholic parrishes. First, Catholic 
parrishes, and in particular these workers, are permanently engaged in social programs 
for displaced persons and generally have a strong and trustworthy relationship with the 
displaced population. Needless to say, trust is essential when adminestering surveys if 
they are to ellicit sensible information from victims of war. Second, although the 
questionnaire includes a question aimed at rightfully identifying displaced persons, 
social workers provide a first screening so as to distinguish displaced households from 
native families.  
The survey elicits information regarding the forced migration process, the 
socioeconomic conditions before and after displacement, land tenure status, agricultural 
production, access to government aid, and the level of desire to return. The migration 
process is characterized at length through the information collected about the armed 
actors who caused the displacement, the triggers behind the displacement, and the 
reasons for choosing the particular reception municipality. Socioeconomic conditions 
before and after displacement are gathered with respect to household composition, 
health status, access to health services, school enrollment, access to labor markets, labor 
income, asset ownership, access to formal and informal credits, and the level of 
participation in formal organizations. Included were two sections with detailed 
                                                 
8 The variables used to stratify the sample were the desire to return, land tenure status, access to 
government aid, geographical region and the number of households in the community.    18
questions about access to land, the characteristics of plots, land losses, the likelihood of 
recovering land upon return, and agrictural production.  
In addition, we used qualitative data from the community reports of the World Bank’s 
‘Moving Out of Poverty’ study.  The purpose of the study was to understand the factors 
that foster movement out of poverty.  Eight case studies were undertaken at return and 
destination sites for displaced households in Colombia. The community reports allow us 
to understand the impact of forced displacement, how forced migration imposes asset 
losses upon the displaced population, and the process by which some households are 
able to recover assets and steadily improve their situations at destination sites. By 
mixing qualitative and quantitative evidence, we are able to identify which households 
are better able to recover from displacement shock, and the dynamics behind this 
recovery.  
3.4. Qualitative analysis 
We analyze the qualitative data from the eight case studies of the World Bank’s 
‘Moving Out of Poverty’ Colombian case study in order to assess the impact of forced 
displacement on household welfare, examine the process of asset loss, and identify the 
different groups of displaced households that emerge after the process of migration and 
asset loss. Three groups among the displaced population that exhibit divergent paths and 
patterns of asset loss and accumulation are identified. The first group consists of 
households that barely had assets at the site of origin, were considered chronically poor, 
had little means for coping with the displacement shock, and, following displacement, 
remained poor and asset deprived. The second group consists of households that had 
large asset holdings at the site of origin, but suffered massive asset losses due to the 
conflict and resulting forced displacement. Upon arrival at destination sites, these 
households fall into poverty and may remain poor—for them, asset recovery is unlikely. 
Finally, there is the third group, which comprises households that had some asset 
holdings at the site of origin, and that, in spite of suffering substantial welfare losses, 
did not suffer as severe a displacement shock as the first two groups. These households 
were able to cope to a certain extent with the displacement shock, accumulate or recover 
assets, and eventually move out of poverty. We concentrate on this last group in 
particular, analyzing the factors and processes that eventually helped them to recover 
their productive abilities and asset base.    19
 
 
3.4.1.  Welfare impacts of forced displacement and the process of asset losses 
Conflict imposes economic costs even before displacement takes place. Civil conflict 
and the presence of armed groups halt economic production, causes assets to become 
undervalued, and hampers government support. Guerrillas and paramilitaries 
increasingly exert control over the civilian population, inclusive of social relations and 
productive activities. As a result, towns in conflict zones face fewer economic 
opportunities, a sudden stop in several farms in agricultural production, a drop in daily 
agricultural wages, and general unemployment. In other communities, the presence of 
illegal armed groups, in addition to restricting economic activity, undermined 
governmental support and eroded social capital. Thus, access to labor training, technical 
assistance programs, credits, and support for productive projects basically disappeared.
9 
Furthermore, the conflict’s dynamics paved the way for the seizure of large proportions 
of households’ possessions. Other sources of asset depletion caused by the conflict have 
included cattle deaths, yield destruction, and the loss of land improvements. The risk of 
new combat and the fact of communities becoming stigmatized as “conflict zones”
10 has 
increased uncertainty, decreased land value, and led households to cut back on 
investments.
11   
Forced displacement produces substantial losses of physical assets, which translate into 
an extreme vulnerability to poverty. Displaced households lose, or leave behind, their 
life’s work, lands, crops, animals, land improvements, investments and houses. All of 
this causes a harsh and sudden decline in living conditions and productive capacity.
12 
Moreover, loosing land and other physical assets not only hinders a household’s 
capacity to earn income, it also eliminates the possibility of production for self-
consumption. A lack of land access entails fewer economic opportunities, impedes the 
                                                 
9 Macajan CR: community time line and community profile. 
10 In Spanish, Zonas Rojas.  
11 Cerotal CR: life ladder and community time line; El Pilar CR: ladder of life.  
12 Cerotal CR: researcher’s follow up.   20
ability to cope properly with the shock of displacement, and is generally identified by 
households as a predominant factor pushing them into poverty.
13  
Some households, however, are able to sell their assets before migrating. Selling assets 
has been a strategy adopted by some—mainly those who migrated as a preventive 
measure
14—in order to mitigate displacement shock during the first months of 
settlement, thus allowing them to enjoy better economic conditions at destination sites. 
Frequently, however, households are obliged to sell assets at prices well below market 
levels.
15 Since the liquid capital from these sales is not large, such distress sales 
generally barely cover consumption needs, and then only for several months, meaning 
that after a few months of settlement at a destination site, it is no longer sustainable as a 
strategy; conditions generally worsen significantly once savings are exhausted.
16 
Distress sales then only postpone the erosion of asset bases, they do not prevent it. 
Furthermore, if households are not able to recover from distress sales, they become 
dependent on labor income to improve their situation at the destination site.
17  
Unfortunately, insertion into urban labor markets tends to be slow due to the 
depreciation of human capital, discrimination against displaced persons, and what are 
often fragile psychological conditions resulting from the shock of displacement. Given 
that displaced households mostly arrive from rural areas and that their working 
experience is limited to agricultural activities, the returns from “agricultural human 
capital” generally decrease in urban areas.
18 Furthermore, discrimination against the 
displaced persons, incidences of post-traumatic syndrome, and changes in household 
composition also work to restrict employment opportunities. Displaced households are 
thus frequently discriminated against, something that ends up constituting another 
hurdle to accessing labor markets.
19 On the other hand, conflict and forced migration 
                                                 
13 Nelson Mandela CR: ladder of life with female participants; Villa Kathy CR: ladder of life with male 
participants; Cerotal CR: researcher’s follow up. 
14 El Pilar CR: Gabriela and Cristina’s life story. 
15 Nelson Mandela CR: Ancisar’s life story; Villa Kathy CR: Eudilce’s life story; Gonzalez Chaparro CR: 
Cristina’s life story.  
16 Gonzalez Chaparro CR: ladder of life with female participants.  
17 El Pilar CR: Andrea’s life story. 
18 Villa Kathy CR: livelihoods, freedom, power, democracy and local governance discussions with female 
participants; Nelson Mandela CR: Diego’s life story & ladder of life with female participants. El Pilar 
CR: Andrea’s life story; Cerotal CR: livelihoods, freedom, power, democracy and local governance with 
male participants.  
19 Revivir de los Campanos CR: livelihoods, freedom, power, democracy and local governance discussion 
with female participants; Villa Kathy CR: community time line; Nelson Mandela CR: researcher’s follow 
up; El Pilar CR: community time line.    21
may cause psychological disorders, which often produce a sense of helplessness, defeat 
and irrational fear. People facing such disorders are usually scared to venture out of 
their homes and search for jobs.
20 Lastly, conflict and forced displacement may produce 
household fragmentation as well as result in the death of or abandonment by household 
members; such individuals are often of a productive age. Women often end up 
becoming the heads of households by default, something which further increases the 
vulnerability of households.
21 All these elements constitute obstacles for finding jobs 
and generating income.
22  
By lacking physical assets, suitable employment opportunities, and risk-sharing 
mechanisms, households face substantial welfare losses and are unprotected against 
current and future shocks. Displaced households leave behind contacts, relatives, 
connections and social networks. Less social capital and possibility for collective action 
means fewer opportunities to work, study, and participate in community savings 
programs; likewise, it means among other things less access to land and productive 
assets.
23 Although some households participate in social networks at destination sites, 
informal risk-sharing mechanisms nonetheless do not fully insure risk as the income 
level of the participants is fairly homogenous.
24 Additionally, prevailing organizations 
at destinations sites are horizontal organizations, which, while instrumental in 
mitigating shocks, are not effective in expanding income. Economic organizations, 
which would be more useful, are less frequent among displacement communities, where 
the community is rather homogenous.
25 
The disruption of social networks also generates obstacles for acquiring formal and 
informal credits.
26 Displaced households lack formal references, assets, stable jobs, and 
collateral, and are thus credit constrained;
27 consequently, investment in land 
                                                 
20 Nelson Mandela CR: researcher’s follow up; Macajan CR: ladder of life with female participants.  
21 Cerotal CR: researcher’s follow up, aspirations of youth with female participants and Ramona’s life 
story.  
22 El Pilar CR: Andrea’s life story.  
23 Nelson Mandela CR: livelihoods, freedom, power, democracy and local governance discussion with 
male participants and ladder of life with female participants; Villa Kathy CR: Eudilce’s life story.  
24 Gonzalez Chaparro CR: Carmelina and Casilda’s life stories.  
25 El Pilar CR: livelihoods, freedom, power, democracy and local governance discussion with female 
participants; Nelson Mandela CR: Esteban’s life story.  
26 Cerotal CR: livelihoods, freedom, power, democracy and local governance discussion with female 
participants; Nelson Mandela CR: Esteban’s life story.  
27 Gonzalez Chaparro CR: ladder of life with male participants; Cerotal CR: livelihoods, freedom, power, 
democracy and local governance discussion with female participants; Nelson Mandela CR: Esteban’s life 
story.    22
improvements or productive projects is rare.
28 Difficulties in accessing formal financial 
markets obliges households to apply for usurious credits, for which guarantees and 
references are not required
29; consequently, profits derived of the resultant productive 
activities are sucked up by the large costs of the credits. Accumulating assets is virtually 
impossible because income is barely sufficient to cover subsistence needs and to pay off 
credits.
30 
Forced displacement imposes significant economic costs upon its victims, and the 
likelihood of recovering from the displacement shock is low.  The above suggests that 
the capacity of displaced households to move out of poverty is limited, as they face 
significant obstacles to generating income and recovering assets. The conditions 
existing for displaced households are disturbing—even better-off displaced households 
that prove able to somehow recuperate asset holdings or earn income from productive 
activities seem unable to fully break out of the poverty trap
31 . 
3.4.2. Three groups of displaced households  
The discussion above illustrates how forced migration and civil conflicts affect the 
welfare of households, erodes asset holdings, and push displaced households into 
poverty. Nevertheless, not all households are equally affected and some prove capable 
of recovering to a certain extent. The qualitative evidence allows us to distinguish three 
subsets of the displaced population based on the different paths they follow toward asset 
recovery—those households which are chronically poor both before and after 
displacement, those households which will possibly become chronically poor, and those 
households capable of initiating a recovery process, but for which the magnitude of 
recovery is unclear.  
The first category—those which are chronically poor both before and after 
displacement
32—were asset-deprived households at the site of origin, and remained 
poor after displacement due to the difficulty in coping with the conflict-induced shock. 
These households exhibit low levels of human capital, are unable to find appropriate 
                                                 
28 Cerotal CR: researcher’s follow up. 
29 Revivir de los Campanos CR: livelihoods, freedom, power, democracy and local governance discussion 
with female participants. 
30 Revivir de los Campanos CR: livelihoods, freedom, power, democracy and local governance discussion 
with female participants. 
31 Nelson Mandela CR: ladder of life with female participants.  
32 In the quantitative analysis in the next section, these households are identified as households with zero 
asset recovery.   23
jobs that match with their agricultural working experience, are fairly isolated from 
social connections, and have household structures that denote a high degree of 
vulnerability to poverty. 
Households falling into poverty following displacement comprise the second group. 
Prior to displacement, these households were better-off and had relatively large asset 
holdings. Because of conflict and displacement, they suffered considerable asset losses, 
and were thus pushed into poverty traps difficult to overcome. The deterioration in the 
economic welfare of these households is particularly large. Asset losses—inclusive of 
the loss of physical, social, financial, human, and institutional assets—have placed them 
on low income trajectories, where the possibility of moving onto high performance 
trajectories is remote. Since the returns from different kinds of assets complement one 
another and this group lacks most of them, providing or gaining access to one asset 
generally does not improve their situation; breaking out of this conflict-induced poverty 
trap is much more complicated.
33 
Lastly are the households capable of achieving successful asset recovery dynamics. 
These households share some common characteristics—higher levels of education and 
training, contact with and access to social networks at reception sites, savings and micro 
credits, and one or more sources of income. To understand which factors contribute to 
asset recovery and the mitigation of displacement shock, we concentrate on analyzing 
this third group of displaced households.   
3.4.3. Which factors contribute to asset recovery and mitigation of the displacement 
shock? 
Several factors allow displaced households to recover their productive capacity, move to 
a high yield trajectory, and, eventually, break out of a conflict-induced poverty trap. 
Better educated households, access to savings and credits, participation in social 
networks, support from government agencies and, in general, the recovery of a certain 
asset base are all factors that contribute to households reaching a higher economic 
trajectory. Nonetheless, owning one type of asset is no guarantee of moving out of 
poverty. As mentioned before, the complementary nature of assets implies that even 
better educated households, or households with access to credits, or which participate in 
social networks, will still fall into poverty unless other assets are available.  
                                                 
33 El Pilar CR: Annex 9.    24
First, better educated households and households whose members have suitable working 
experience are able to engage in economic activities and extract higher rents, in contrast 
to households with no formal education or whose members were previously dedicated 
to agricultural activities. Respondents, as expected, stated that high levels of formal and 
informal education and human capital are key elements characterizing movers.
34 
Women, for instance, associate prosperity with human capital, defined by them as 
“learning occupations and knowing how to handle meetings.”
35 Labor training programs 
then are critical for households hoping to recover their productive capacity and 
undertake new activities—this is particularly true for women, who feel empowered after 
participating in training programs.
36  
Human capital alone, although necessary, is not sufficient to recover from displacement 
shock. Having an additional source of income—whether in the form of savings, credits 
or the exploitation of land plots—is crucial to the recovery process.
37 If, for example, 
labor training is provided, but there is no access to seed capital or micro credits, the 
labor training will prove useless. Added to that, access to micro credits is not a 
substitute for seed capital.
38 Thus, while labor training does boost confidence and 
provide knowledge relevant to an unknown occupation (and thus eases psychological 
distress), it must be complemented with seed capital in order to be effective.
39 The 
proper use of savings—presumably those derived from the sale of assets—together with 
access to micro credits, ameliorates the displacement shock and eases the process of 
settlement and recovery. Savings and liquid capital from the sale of assets at the site of 
origin are instrumental for satisfying basic needs during migration, as well as coping 
with displacement shock. However, households who successfully recover from the 
consequences of displacement additionally allocate savings and resources from asset 
sales to the recovery of productive capacity, and not exclusively to supplying basic 
needs. Households often use these resources to access land plots at destination sites, 
                                                 
34 El Pilar CR: ladder of life with male participants and Liliana’s life story. Cerotal CR: Diego’s life story; 
Nelson Mandela CR: ladder of life with female participants; Nelson Mandela CR: community time line; 
Cerotal CR: researcher’s follow up; Macajan CR: Bertilda’s life story.  
35 Villa Kathy CR: ladder of life with female participants.  
36 Cerotal CR: researcher’s follow up. 
37 Nelson Mandela CR: ladder of life with female participants. 
38 Villa Kathy CR: livelihoods, freedom, power, democracy and local governance discussion with female 
participants. 
39 El Pilar CR: Lilia’s life story.   25
invest in land improvements, or purchase livestock as a saving mechanism.
40 In most 
cases, asset recovery depends upon the ability of households to sell their properties at 
the site of origin, access credits, and use this capital properly in order to engage in 
productive activities.
41 
Acquiring productive assets—especially land plots for agricultural exploitation—and 
investment resources are critical for the recovery process. Access to land via different 
mechanisms
42 provides a wider range of economic opportunities, diversifies sources of 
income, and helps households find more productive activities.
43 Land tenure also allows 
households to recover their peasant identity, to develop an economic activity compatible 
with their abilities, and to diversify their sources of income; it also eases the process of 
settlement and adaptation.
44  
Income generating programs, which provide seed capital to households, merit a separate 
discussion. Households able to recover their productive capabilities generally had 
access to income generating programs and seed capital. Nonetheless, most beneficiaries 
of income generating programs consider the amount of seed capital provided to be 
insufficient for starting a profitable business. Businesses work better when a group of 
households come together and pool their seed capital.
45 Because projects can be 
potentially larger, and the risk is shared among its members, businesses initiated by a 
group of several families, or projects promoting cooperatives or associative income 
generating schemes seem to have a higher impact and a greater likelihood of succeeding 
than individual projects and disbursements.
46  
                                                 
40 Cerotal CR: Julio’s life story and community time line. Nelson Mandela CR: community time line, 
ladder of life with female participants and researcher’s follow up; Macajan CR: ladder of life with male 
participants.  
41 Cerotal CR: ladder of life with female participants; Nelson Mandela CR: ladder of life with female 
participants.  
42 It is interesting to consider two different mechanisms by which households gain access to land plots. In 
Cerotal, some households accessed land plots through the mechanism of Mendevieros, whereby 
households lease land plots and divide the agricultural production with the land owner. Although at first 
the household does not own land, this mechanism has proven instrumental in obtaining income and 
slowly recovering productive assets. In Nelson Mandela, on the other hand, peasant associations have 
handed out land plots to their members. Agricultural exploitation of these land plots has enabled some 
households to engage in successful dynamics leading to asset recovery.  
43 Nelson Mandela CR: community time line; Cerotal CR: researcher’s follow up.  
44 Nelson Mandela CR: researcher’s follow up.  
45 Gonzalez Chaparro CR: livelihoods, freedom, power, democracy and local governance discussion with 
male participants. 
46 Revivir de los Campanos CR: ladder of life with male participants.    26
Savings, seed capital and liquid capital, however, are not sufficient to ensure that asset 
recovery is successful. The impact of these resources may be limited as sometimes 
households are compelled to use seed capital to satisfy basic needs.
47 Other times, 
households face difficulties starting small businesses due to a lack of assets and the high 
costs of public utilities.
48 Additionally, low levels of human capital impede the 
possibility of taking advantage of credit or business opportunities. When seed capital is 
provided without proper training, resources may extinguish rapidly. Training programs 
on how to effectively sell products may increase the positive impact derived of 
providing seed capital and/or micro credits to displaced households.
49 When capital is 
available and subsistence needs are covered, training programs increase the likelihood 
of households initiating a successful recovery process.
50 In most cases, access to credits 
and liquid capital depends upon their participation in social networks.  
The importance of social networks and social capital in facilitating the move out of 
poverty is manifold. First, social networks provide resources and assistance during the 
migration process such as fulfill basic needs. Second, social networks at reception 
municipalities may provide households with employment opportunities as well as much 
needed working and business permits.
51 Associations are also instrumental for obtaining 
benefits from the government or from NGO programs—among these are labor training, 
public utilities, selling agreements with local businesses, and the legal recognition of 
households as displaced persons. Furthermore, networks provide useful information on 
how to generate income, obtain jobs, and access government programs.
52  
Social capital and collective action then is perceived as a way of moving out of poverty 
because it provides low-cost inputs, credits, training, representation in public and non-
governmental institutions, and stability.
53 Access to these services and benefits is only 
                                                 
47 Gonzalez Chaparro CR: livelihoods, freedom, power, democracy and local governance discussion with 
male participants. 
48 Gonzalez Chaparro CR: livelihoods, freedom, power, democracy and local governance discussion with 
female participants. 
49 Gonzalez Chaparro CR: livelihoods, freedom, power, democracy and local governance discussion with 
male participants; Revivir de los Campanos CR: community time line.  
50 Nelson Mandela CR: time line for the Amabrema’s peasants association  
51 In the Cerotal community, for example, the local organization of displaced households instituted 
programs providing entrepreneurship training as well as road maintenance, which generates seasonal jobs 
for displaced households (CEm). 
52 Revivir de los Campanos CR: ladder of life with female participants.  
53 Nelson Mandela CR: ladder of life with male participants; Cerotal CR: livelihoods, freedom, power, 
democracy and local governance discussion with female participants.   27
possible through strong social networks.
54 However, not all households participate in 
these networks; households require contacts, and that eventually relatives and friends 
become members of these community associations, in order to reap any benefits.  
As with human capital and credits, participation in social networks does not guarantee 
in and of itself a transition to high yield activities. Even households that actively 
participate in formal organizations often remain trapped in low-yield trajectories 
because access to capital for investment purposes is restricted and property rights are 
not well defined.  
The qualitative evidence from the ‘Moving Out of Poverty’ study in Colombia provides 
insights into the virtuous and vicious cycles that characterize the process of asset 
recovery. These cycles are consistent with the high- and low-yield trajectories of an 
asset based approach to poverty, and are assessed in greater detail in the following 
section. It is noteworthy that successful asset recovery dynamics such as exhibit 
virtuous cycles require human, financial, physical and social capital. Gaining access to 
physical assets or participating in social networks alone is not sufficient for recovering 
from displacement shock. Movers can thus be identified as households that are able to 
recover a broad asset base, and then use it to set off the negative effects inflicted by 
forced displacement and gain access to high-yield productive activities. Better off 
households are able to recuperate more rapidly from displacement shock because they 
acquire productive assets.
55  
3.5. Quantitative analysis: the determinants of asset losses and asset accumulation 
 
To identify the determinants for assets losses and asset accumulation among displaced 
households using the models specified in section 3.2., we estimate a group of 
regressions. Before discussing the determinants of asset dynamics, we discuss some 
descriptive statistics, and analyze the magnitude of asset loss stemming from forced 
displacement. The figures for asset loss are only estimated for the control group; this 
allows us to use expansion factors and estimate the aggregate loss for the entire 
displaced population of Colombia.  
                                                 
54 Nelson Mandela CR: community time line with male participants, time line for the Ambarema’s 
peasant association, ladder of life with male participants; El Pilar CR: displaced association mini case 
study; Cerotal CR: aspirations of youth with female participants; Macajan CR: Dairo’s life story.  
55 Cerotal CR: conflict time line with male and female participants.    28
The displacement process and household characteristics are presented in Table 1. First, 
the level of violence in the regions of origin is extremely large. Most households, more 
than 86 percent, displaced reactively
56, that is after being the victim of an attack from 
illegal armed groups. Moreover, while displaced households perceive the presence of 
illegal armed groups in most of the cases (89.6%), perception of presence of 
government forces, which provide protection, is much lower (50.3%). Second, although 
some households prefer to migrate in the close vicinity of their hometown (15.2%), 
most migrate out of their municipality and directly to destination municipality. Third, 
displaced households are a particular vulnerable group of the Colombian population. 
When compared to the urban poor, displaced households are larger, with a higher 
frequency of female household heads, and with greater dependency ratios. In addition, 
the percentage of ethnic minorities for displaced households is higher than for the 
Colombian population (Ibáñez y Moya, 2006b). 
Table 1. Displacement process and household characteristics 
  Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
Reactive Displacement  86.2% 
Perception of presence of illegal armed groups – origin  89.6% 
Perception of presence of government forces – origin  50.3% 
Intramunicipal displacement  15.2% 
Intradepartmental displacement  57.6% 
Migration directly to destination  88.9% 
Ethnic minority  24.2% 
Male households head  62.7% 
Household size  5.16 
(2.14) 
Number of persons between 12 and 17 years   0.84 
(0.99) 
Number of persons between 18 and 65  2.48 
(1.36) 
Dependency ratio  0.34 
(0.34) 
Years of age – Household head  42.6 
(13.3) 
Number of persons between 12 and 17 years   0.84 
(0.99) 
Number of persons between 18 and 65  2.48 
(1.36) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
. 
The loss and recovery of housing, physical capital and land are presented in Table 2. 
The abandonment, loss or destruction of housing is significative; nearly half of the 
                                                 
56 A household displaces reactively when it is victim of direct treat, a homicide of a household member, 
forced recruitment, abduction, or a massacre of some or one household member.    29
sample reports loosing their home as a consequence of displacement, and only a few 
households are able to acquire new houses at destination sites. However, close to 18 
percent of households’ homes were not legally owned prior to displacement, whereas 
following displacement, there was a greater tendency to own houses at destination sites. 
The average monetary housing loss per household is US$ 3,333
57.  
Because households are seldom able to transport and sell their assets, productive assets 
are abandoned at origin municipalities and are rarely recovered. Productive assets other 
than land and plot improvements comprise the greater bulk of asset loss, and are 
difficult to recover following displacement. In fact, productive asset depletion worsens 
over time following settlement at destination sites. On the other hand, households are 
able to recover with much greater ease less expensive articles, such as electronic 
appliances and mobile goods (such as vehicles).  
Land seizure or abandonment is also considerable. Given the predominant proportion of 
the displaced population having a rural origin, nearly 55 percent of households had 
formal or informal access to land; the average size of land plots, 13.2 hectares, is not 
negligible. Recovering land once the conflict ends is a complex process, given the weak 
property rights that prevail in Colombian rural areas—over 30 percent of households 
legally owned the land, while the remaining households had only informal access to 
land.  Moreover, only 12.8 percent still control their land plots following displacement, 
either directly or with the support of family and friends. Consequently, only 25 percent 
of households are deemed likely to recover land upon their return. Aggregate land loss 
for the displaced population is 1.2 million hectares,
58 a figure two times the amount of 
land distributed in agrarian reform programs for the period 1993 - 2002. If recovering 
land is difficult, it is even more so for the capital invested to improve land plots or 
increase agricultural productivity. Close to one fifth of land plots had irrigation, the 
average number of livestock was 29, and the net present value of foregone agricultural 
revenue over a life-time is US$ 15,787 per household.
59 
                                                 
57 We used the exchange rate for 09/02/2007, which stood at US$ 1 = COP$ 2,160.  
58 In order to estimate the aggregated figures for the Colombian displaced population, we use the 
estimated number of people and households calculated in Ibáñez et al (2006)—554.207 households and 
2,459,613 persons.  
59 To calculate the net present value of foregone agricultural revenues, we assume that agricultural 
production ends when the household head dies and use a discount rate of 9.5%. According to the WHO, 
the life expectancy of women and men in Colombian rural areas is 76.3 and 67.5 years, respectively.    30
Losses of housing, physical capital and land are substantial and recouping these assets 
after displacement appears to be a lengthy process. When physical assets and land are 
accounted for, the average loss per household is nearly US$ 7,037; the aggregate figure 
for the entire displaced population approaches 1.7 percent of Colombia’s GDP for 2004. 
The capacity of displaced households to recover from this kind of asset loss is limited. 
If we measure the recovery of assets as the value of assets at the destination site minus 
the value of assets at the site of origin, on average, households report a net loss of 
approximately US$ 3,796 per household.  
Table 2. Asset losses and asset recovery: housing, physical capital and land 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Error 
Housing    
Percentage of households that lost housing at the origin site  46.50%  - 
Percentage of households that lost housing at the origin site 
and recovered it at the reception site 
6.40% - 
Percentage of households that did not own housing at the 
origin site and owned housing at the destination site 
17.90% - 
Average loss in housing  US $ 3,333  US $ 278 
Physical assets    
Productive assets (excluding land) – origin site  US $ 370  US $ 42 
Other assets – origin site  US $ 93  US $ 5 
Percentage of productive assets – origin site  55.20%  0.02% 
Productive assets (excluding land) – destination site  US $ 19  US $ 5 
Other assets – destination site  US $ 93  US $ 5 
Percentage of productive assets – destination site  12.80%  0.03% 
Land    
Land tenure  55.40%  - 
Total hectares of land owned  13.2  2.1 
Value of total hectares owned  US $ 3,981  US $ 417 
Percentage of hectares with formal property titles  31.20%  - 
Average number of hectares lost   4  0.8 
Value of hectares lost  US $ 972  US $ 185 
Percentage of hectares than can be recovered after return  25.80%  - 
Percentage of hectares under family control  12.80%  - 
Percentage of land with irrigation  19.00%  - 
Number of animals  29.9  2.6 
Net present value of agricultural profit losses  US $ 15,787 US $ 2,500 
Total assets and asset recovery    
Value of assets at origin site (excluding land)  US $ 7,037  US $ 278 
Value of assets at destination site (excluding land)  US $ 3,194  US $ 231 
Net loss of assets  US $ - 3,796 US $ 32 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
 
The displacement shock, aside from significantly decreasing victims’ asset holdings, 
condenses the asset distribution around a lower mean and median. Graph 1 depicts the 
distribution of asset values before and after displacement. Prior to displacement, the 
mean and median of asset values are larger and the distribution more spread out; asset   31
values at the upper tail of the distribution are more frequent. Following displacement, 
the distribution condenses, with not a single household lies well above the mean and 
median of the distribution.   
 
 




































8 Assets - origin and today
Value assets origin Value assets destination
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
Asset recovery is difficult for most displaced households. A quartile graph for asset 
recovery is shown in Graph 2. The majority of households, close to 75 percent, face 
negative or zero asset recovery, while only 25 percent of households are able to recover 
assets following displacement. The median of asset recovery is consequently zero, 
indicating a worrisome trend, as the traditional strategies adopted by households for 
recuperating assets are hardly available for the vast majority of displaced households.   
Graph 2. Asset recovery
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
a. Asset recovery is measured as the value of assets in destination sites minus asset losses due to 
displacement. 
Although households could resort to labor income, credits, and risk-sharing mechanisms 
in order to recover assets, access to these mechanisms is not widespread among the 
displaced population. Figures for financial capital, access to labor markets, human 
capital and social capital before and after displacement are presented in Table 3. First, 
the potential access to informal credits drops sharply following displacement (from 
17.9% to 9.3%). Because the access to formal credit markets at sites of origin was 
negligible, the access at destination sites increases five fold, in spite of the fact that only 
6.6 percent of households are the beneficiaries of formal credits. Furthermore, credit 
conditions gradually worsen at destination sites—the amounts approved are half of 
those at the site of origin, and the number of monthly installments declines.  
Drops in returns on asset holdings are not compensated fully by labor income. 
Unemployment rates for all household members soar following displacement, and the 
pace at which labor conditions improve is extremely slow—the unemployment rates of 
household heads during the first three months of settlement at destination sites is 53 
percent and, after a year, 16 percent. Since displaced households face poor labor 
conditions and are mostly absorbed by informal labor markets, the labor income per 
equivalent adult corresponds to less than half the labor income prior to displacement.  
Depreciation of human capital and low education levels are important obstacles for 
displaced households looking to compete in urban markets. Tight labor markets at 
destination sites may partially hinder the rapid absorption of displaced households.   33
Hence, even after a year of settlement, unemployment rates for displaced household 
heads are still greater than those for the urban extreme poor. Low formal human capital 
(5.7 years) and inadequate previous labor experience with respect to urban jobs (57.3% 
were dedicated to agriculture prior to displacement) may be the main cause driving 
these high unemployment rates.  
Informal risk-sharing mechanisms are also severely disrupted. Informal credits, as 
discussed above, drop significantly. Some families disintegrate because of the main 
breadwinner dying or abandoning the household (8.5%). Distance and reduced 
interaction weaken links with social networks at the site of origin, and having contacts 
at destination sites is not common, and while households that participated in 
organizations prior to displacement often rapidly recover participation at destination 
sites, the nature of the organizations involved tends to shift dramatically.  Previous to 
displacement, households were generally members of organizations dedicated to 
fostering productive activities (e.g., peasant organizations and cooperatives) through the 
provision of credits, technical assistance and mediation with formal institutions. At 
destination sites, households are mostly members of organizations dedicated to charity 
work—that is, organizations aimed at providing subsistence support rather than 
promoting productive activities. 
Table 3. Financial capital, labor markets, human capital and social capital 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Financial capital – informal credits    
Potential access to informal credits – origin site  17.90%  - 
Access to informal credits- origin site  8.30%  - 
Potential access to informal credits – destination site  9.30%  - 
Access to informal credits – destination site  6.40%  - 
Financial capital – formal credits    
Access to formal credits – origin site  1.40%  - 
Credit amount - origin site  US$ 1,481  US $ 1,019 
Number of monthly installments –origin site  14.5  1 
Access to formal credits – destination site  6.60%  - 
Amount of credit – destination site  US $ 741  US $ 185 
Number of monthly installments – destination site  10.4  1.4 
Labor markets    
Unemployment level for household heads – origin site  1.70%  - 
Labor income per equivalent adult – origin site  US $ 893  US $ 151 
Unemployment level for household heads – destination site  16.10%  - 
Labor income per equivalent adult – destination site  US $ 289  US $ 17 
Human Capital    
Years of education of household head  5.7  0.1 
Dedicated to agricultural activities – origin site  57.30%  -   34
Social capital    
Main breadwinner died or abandoned household  8.50%  - 
Participation in organizations –origin site  32.60%  - 
Number of organizations per household –origin site  0.33  0.03 
Leadership position – origin site  7.50%  - 
Participation in organizations –destination site  29.00%  - 
Number of organizations per household –destination site  0.25  0.02 
Leadership position – destination site  4.20%  - 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
 
Given that the displaced population has limited means for recovering assets, we are left 
with the question of what determines the capacity of some households to lift themselves 
up following asset shock. Is asset recovery related to the conflict-induced shock? Are 
income generating programs contributing to this recovery? Or is it simply that these 
households have been settled for a longer period? Did they manage to perform better in 
urban labor markets? Graphs 3 through 6 offer some preliminary insights regarding 
these questions.  
Migrating after being the direct victim of an attack and the presence of illegal armed 
groups produce larger asset losses. As discussed in section 3.2., when households are 
forced to migrate after being the victim of a direct attack (reactive displacement), the 
opportunities to protect or sell assets are scarce, causing larger assets losses as shown in 
Graph 3a. On the other hand, households migrating preventively seem better able to 
adopt strategies to reduce the likelihood of asset losses. Graph 3b depicts asset losses 
for households who perceive and do not perceive the presence of illegal armed groups. 
Asset losses are seemingly larger for the former group of households, yet the difference 
is not large.  
Graph 3. Asset losses: preventive vs. reactive displacement and presence of illegal 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
While income generating programs, the length of settlement and access to labor markets 
appear to promote asset recovery, their impact is barely perceptible. Graph 4a illustrates 
the distribution for asset recovery between the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of 
income generating programs. The median of asset recovery is slightly less for non-
beneficiaries, and a larger proportion of beneficiaries have recovered their assets 
following displacement. Nonetheless, even prior to controlling for other household 
characteristics, the impact of income generating programs does not seem to be 
significant.  
Unlike traditional migrants, displaced households do not catch up as settlement at 
destination sites progresses. Asset recovery and time of settlement, as shown in Graph 
4b, exhibit an inverted u-shape relation, yet as the time of settlement becomes longer the 
impact on asset recovery is hardly perceptible. As settlement consolidates, a mild 
recovery occurs which is just sufficient to reach a zero asset loss after ten years of 
settlement. This result is reinforced by complementary empirical evidence which shows 
that the conditions of the displaced population worsen following the conclusion of 
humanitarian aid
60. In fact, vulnerability increases when humanitarian aid ends—access 
to public utilities decreases, the capacity for smoothing income is severely disrupted, 
and children have to interrupt their schooling (Ibáñez y Moya, 2006a).  
                                                 
60 Displaced households are entitled to three months of humanitarian aid after registering in government 
official records.    36
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
Job quality apparently determines the contribution of employment to the process of 
asset recovery. Graph 5 illustrates the distribution of asset recovery for employed and 
unemployed households. The difference between both groups is apparently not 
significant. When a household’s head is employed, asset recovery is slightly larger; 
notably, the proportion of employed households with positive recovery is wider. Most 
displaced households, however, are employed in the informal sector, where they earn 
low incomes, and are not insured by social security programs. Labor income then may 
be only sufficient to cover subsistence needs, leaving no surplus for investment in asset 
accumulation.   37
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
 
Once the sample is divided into the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of income 
generating programs, however, conclusions regarding the impact of labor income on 
asset accumulation diverge. For non-beneficiaries of income generating programs, the 
quadratic fit shows no relation whatsoever between labor income and asset recovery. 
Our interpretation of the last paragraph thus seems appropriate for this group of 
displaced households—since displaced households are generally employed in low 
quality jobs with poor wages, the income earned is barely sufficient to cover subsistence 
needs. On the other hand, earnings generated by beneficiaries of income generating 
programs do in fact contribute to the recovery of assets. Three complementary 
explanations might be driving these results. First, income generating programs are able 
to connect beneficiaries to higher quality jobs with larger wages and labor benefits. 
Consequently, labor income is sufficient to cover subsistence needs and allow for 
savings. Second, income generating programs might be supplemented with other 
benefits, such as nutritional programs, which complement labor income and thus enable 
households to save and accumulate assets. Third, the beneficiaries of income generating 
programs may have particular characteristics which enable them to fare better on urban 
labor markets. 
 
Graph 6. The recovery of assets and labor income: beneficiaries and non-
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
The graphs above show that uncovering the factors that contribute to recovering assets 
is not straightforward. While income generating programs, labor markets, and the length 
of settlement positively influence asset recovery, the conflict shock negatively 
influences the recuperation of assets. The regressions below contribute to inquire further 
into this issue.  
3.5.1. Asset losses 
We estimate regressions in order to identify, first, the determinants of asset losses. 
Several regressions were estimated to check for robustness of the results. Table 4 
presents the results for OLS, IV and the quartile regressions. We estimate separate 
regressions for groups of variables representing conflict dynamics and the victimization 
profile, the strategies adopted by households, and variables that may capture purposive 
targeting of armed groups. Given that some characteristics of the department of origin 
may also determine asset losses, we estimate regressions with and without department
61 
controls. As armed groups may adopt different displacement tactics depending upon the 
war strategy they are seeking, we estimate each regression separately for massive and 
individual displacement. We expect that when the war objective of illegal armed groups 
is to depopulate territory in order to strengthen territorial control, expelling the 
                                                 
61 Departments are similar to States in the United States.    39
population en masse (massive displacement) is more effective. On the other hand, when 
asset seizure is the objective, deliberate targeting of particular households (individual 
displacement) is the displacement tactic adopted. The latter may adjust better to the 
model we defined. Lastly, we expect that beneficiaries of income generation programs 
have unobservable characteristics closely related to their entrepreneurial abilities, which 
in turn may help design strategies to protect assets. Hence, we estimate the regressions 
separately for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of income generation programs. Since 
results are robust to the different specifications, we only present the estimations for the 
complete sample with department controls. However, we discuss when the different 
specifications cause a significant change in the results.  
As households may decide to migrate within the municipality to protect assets, 
intramunicipal displacement is an endogenous variable. We use instrumental variable 
estimations to correct for endogeneity. Besides protecting assets, households may 
decide to migrate within the municipality if friends and families residing in the 
destination site may provide support. Notwithstanding, contacts in destination sites, 
such as family and friends, does not determine the extent of asset losses. Contact in 
destination sites are therefore used as the exclusion variables. Results for the first stage 
of the instrumental variable regression are presented in Table A.1 of the Annex. Lastly, 
the process of asset losses may be highly non-linear. In order to capture these non-
linearities, we estimate quartile regressions.  
The impact of the conflict upon asset losses is hardly offset by strategies adopted to 
mitigate asset losses or protection from government forces. Conflict dynamics exert a 
heavy toll upon asset. Reactive displacement, and loosing the male household head are 
statistically significant, the magnitudes of the coefficients are large, and results are 
robust for different specifications. Moreover, the coefficient of reactive displacement 
becomes larger and statistically significant for the upper quartiles, while it is not 
significant for the first quartile. The coefficient estimates for reactive displacement 
decreases when additional controls are included, yet this is expected as violence is 
targeted to particular groups of the population (e.g. land owners, young persons, etc). 
Direct and traumatic victimization represented by reactive displacement and loosing the 
main breadwinner imposes losses of COP$3.4 million (US$1.574) and $COP6.7 million 
(US$3101) respectively.    40
The diverse strategies adopted by households or by government forces to mitigate asset 
losses are not sufficient to offset the impact of the conflict. Migrating within the 
municipality and the presence of government forces reduce asset losses stemming from 
displacement. Nevertheless, the combined effect of both variables is COP$5.8 million, 
which does not even counteract loosing the main household breadwinner. In addition, 
the positive impact of migrating within the municipality is not robust to different 
specification. When department controls are included, the size of the coefficient halves; 
thus, this variable may be capturing some regional effects and not necessarily the 
effectiveness of intramunicipal displacement. Once the variable is instrumentalized, the 
statistical significance disappears. Households may migrate within the municipality in 
order to maintain close control of productive assets and to continue productive 
activities, allowing households to keep control of their assets. An alternative hypothesis 
may be that households facing a tighter budget constraint migrate within the 
municipality to avoid the higher costs of migrating longer distances. The quartile 
regressions also show no statistical significance of intramunicipal displacement. On the 
other hand, the effectiveness of government forces is robust to different specifications, 
yet the impact does not offset either reactive displacement or losses of the main 
breadwinner.  
Formal titles of land plots, instead of reducing asset losses, seem to increase the extent 
of asset losses. We expected formality of land titles to prevent large asset losses as 
illegal armed groups may prefer to seize land plots with no protection of legal titles. The 
coefficient of formality is not only positive and significant, but also the magnitude is the 
largest (COP$9.8 million-US$4537). A possible explanation is that land plots with 
formal titles are the largest and thus the most attractive ones. However, after controlling 
for size of land plots, the size and significance of the coefficient are similar. The 
presence of government forces does not prevent land seizures, even to formal 
landowners. Another interpretation is that formal titles, when lack of the rule of law is 
pervasive, are not sufficient to protect assets. To test for this hypothesis, we interact 
formality of land titles with presence of government forces. Again, the size and 
significance of the coefficient are similar. In addition, quartile regressions show the 
impact of formality in land titles is particularly strong for the median quartile, while 
decreasing for the last one. Illegal armed groups target land owners to accumulate land, 
and increase territorial control. Land plots with formal titles may be more valuable as   41
land owners had larger resources to legally register the ownership. The positive effect of 
land plot size on asset losses seems to corroborate this hypothesis. Since lack of rule of 
law in these regions allowed illegal armed groups to emerge in the first place, protection 
of property rights may be highly inefficient or practically inexistent.  
Targeting of particular groups of the population in order to achieve war objectives also 
imposes large asset losses, but some variables are not statistically significant. First, 
better educated households face greater asset losses and, as the quartile regressions 
indicate, the effect increases for the highest quartiles. Better educated households may 
assume leadership positions in the community; thus, illegal armed groups may target 
these households to terrorize the civil population and prevent civil resistance. However, 
the coefficient for years of schooling is not robust to different specifications of the 
model. Second, young household members, as they are forcefully recruited or may act 
as combatants in the opponents groups, are targeted often. These attacks appear to 
increase asset losses. This effect is particularly strong for persons between 18 and 65 
years of age: having an additional member in this age increases asset losses by COP$1.2 
million (US$555). Third, although the coefficient for participation in formal 
organizations is positive, it is not statistically significant. However, when quartile 
regressions are estimated, participation in organizations implies positive asset losses for 
the median and third quartile, and the impact is not negligible. For example, in the case 
of the median quartile, participation in one organization more increases asset losses in 
COP$0.75 million (US$347), while the increment in asset losses from reactive 
displacement for this quartile is COP$1.2 million (US$555). Lastly, ethnic minorities 
are not facing additional asset losses. When department controls are not included, asset 
losses for ethnic minorities are larger. This effect vanishes after including department 
controls. Regions where ethnic minorities are located coincide with regions strategically 
important for illegal armed groups. Thus, ethnic minorities may be attacked for living in 
strategically valuable regions, and not necessarily for being ethnic minorities.    42
Table 4. Determinants of asset losses
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Reactive displacement  4868.60 
(3.66)*** 












Hh head dead or left  6988.40 
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Perception presence: illegal armed groups  -4186.06 
(-1.35) 
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Observations  2320 2318 2318 2318 2318 2318 2318 2318 2318 
R-squared  0.0448  0.2067  0.0514 0.217 0.2251  0.2205 0.0403 01383 0.1067 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
Department Controls are included 
a. Asset losses are divided by 1000. 
*Significant at 10%. 
**Significant at 5%. 
***Significant at 1%   43
The results presented in Table 4 clearly indicate that the conflict-induced shock imposes larger 
asset losses. Moreover, asset losses are larger for groups of the displaced population that are 
purposively attacked by illegal armed groups. Although some strategies are effective to mitigate 
asset losses, the protection from these strategies are not sufficient to counteract the negative 
influence of attacks.  
3.5.2. Asset accumulation 
In order to understand the process of asset accumulation, we estimate regressions to identify the 
determinants of asset accumulation. Several alternative specifications were estimated to verify 
the robustness of the results. First, asset accumulation, besides being determined by households’ 
characteristics, may depend on regional characteristics as well as the municipality size. Some 
regions are more prosperous, their labor markets are more dynamic, and/or are willing to receive 
displaced population, among others. These factors contribute to the displaced population’s asset 
accumulation process. In addition, the size of the urban center may determine how easy or 
difficult is to acquire new asset holdings. Although large cities may provide more economic 
opportunities, adapting to a large and anonymous city may prove hard for rural households such 
as the displaced population. To control for city size, we include controls for Bogotá (the Capital 
city of Colombia), large cities with populations between 700.000 and 3’000.000 people, and 
medium size cities with populations between 100.000 and 699.000 people. The excluded control 
is small cities with less than 100.000 inhabitants. To control for regional heterogeneity, we 
include department controls.  Second, we estimate the determinants of asset accumulation 
separately for length of settlement, income generation capacities, and household vulnerability.  
Instrumental variables regressions and quartile regressions are also estimated. Since, among other 
factors, income generating programs are not randomly assigned, and households are selected 
according to the magnitude of their vulnerability and economic conditions, being the beneficiary 
of such programs constitutes an endogenous variable. To correct for this endogeneity, we employ 
an instrumental variables approach, utilizing whether the household perceives social conditions, 
such as access to education and coverage of health services, worsened after displacement. These 
perceptions are paradoxically not related to economic conditions in destination sites, and seem to 
depend on the extent of welfare drops as a consequence of displacement and the victimization 
process. Both processes produce mistrust in government institutions, prevent households from 
seeking government support, and deter participation in income generation programs. However,   44
these perceptions does not necessary determine asset accumulation in destination sites. The first 
stage of the instrumental variable regression is presented in Table A.2 of the Annex. Equally than 
for asset losses, asset accumulation exhibits several non-linearities as shown in the graphs 
discussed in section 3.4. To handle these non-linearities, we estimate quartile regressions.  
Results for all the regressions are presented in Tables 5a and 5b. Results for the regressions 
without controls for city size are not presented as coefficient estimates are robust to the inclusion 
of these controls, and the prediction power of the model barely increases. As settlement at 
destination sites progresses, asset accumulation expands. The coefficient and its significance are 
similar for the different specifications estimated. We also included interactions for length of 
settlement and some household characteristics, such as being previously dedicated to agricultural 
activities and loosing the main breadwinner, but the coefficients were not statistically significant 
and are thus not reported. However, the length of settlement’s contribution is not large and even 
decreases after a while, exhibiting the inverted u-shaped relation mentioned before. After 
controlling for all the other variables, a displaced household would spend more than 11 years 
recovering the average asset losses stemming from displacement. If government agencies then 
assume that displaced persons are similar to migrants, and do not provide special aid programs, 
thus leaving displaced households on their own, asset accumulation will not be sufficient to help 
households escape the poverty trap nor to recover the asset lost as a consequence of the conflict. 
Furthermore, the effect of length of settlement is weak for households located in the first two 
quartiles of the regression, and pick up for households located in the upper end of the asset 
distribution.  
Insertion into labor markets and the capacity to generate income positively contribute to 
accumulate assets in destination. In particular, insertion in labor markets appears as an effective 
strategy to increase asset accumulation; having an unemployed head reduces asset accumulation 
by COP$1.4 millions (US$648). Inasmuch as being unemployed diminishes asset accumulation 
by a sizeable magnitude, labor markets influence a household’s capacity for recovering assets. 
Although the coefficient for unemployment decreases somehow when additional controls are 
included, the size of the coefficient is still large and it is significant for the different 
specifications. The negative impact of unemployment is particularly large for households located 
in the upper quartile of the asset distribution.    45
Human capital variables play an important role for asset accumulation, yet the sign for previous 
dedication to agricultural activities is the opposite to the expected one. Better educated 
households are able to accumulate more assets, yet the effect is not large given the low education 
levels of the displaced population. One additional year of education for an average displaced 
household whose head has 5.7 years of schooling increases asset accumulation in COP$0.12 
million (US$55). The effect of educations vanishes, however, for quartile regressions and is only 
significant for households located in the lowest quartile. On the other hand, being previously 
dedicated to agriculture contributes positively to expand asset holdings. This result is opposite to 
the a priori hypothesis we explained in previous sections. In addition, the result is robust to all 
the different specifications. Presumably, after controlling for other characteristics, this variable 
may be capturing some unobservable characteristics such as the entrepreneurial ability of persons 
who had small agricultural enterprises before displacement. Lastly, asset accumulation is higher 
for households with middle-aged heads; those with young or old heads have more difficulties 
acquiring new assets. The impact of age is higher as we move up the quartiles. 
Asset in origin sites still under the control of the household and social capital does not contribute 
in any way to increase asset accumulation. Assets in origin sites are not statistically significant 
and the coefficient is negligible. Despite being able to control a proportion of their assets in 
origin, these assets may not be producing rents or the rents may not be sufficient to expand asset 
holdings. Social capital, represented by number of organizations in destination sites and contacts, 
is not statistically significant in any of the specifications estimated. Therefore, only human capital 
seems to contribute to expanding asset holdings in destination sites.  
After controlling for other characteristics, the contribution of income generating programs to 
asset accumulation is large and significant. Asset holdings for beneficiaries of income generation 
programs are COP$2.2 millions (US$1018) larger. The coefficient for beneficiaries of income 
generation programs is not robust, however. When additional controls are included, the 
coefficient decreases significantly. This result is expected as being the beneficiary of income 
generation programs is related to household characteristics. The impact of income generating 
programs is indeed strong for households in quartile IV. Ibáñez and Moya (2006a) find that these 
programs have a short-term impact on consumption, labor income, and the capacity to mitigate 
shocks. They also observe that these programs were not effective in preventing households from 
adopting costly long-term strategies like household fragmentation, the interruption of schooling,   46
and child labor. Nevertheless, income generating programs do somehow contribute to asset 
recovery. Possibly as a precautionary response and feeling highly uncertain regarding the long-
term impact of the program, earnings from income generating programs are generally invested in 
accumulating assets while consumption remains constant. As has been shown in some empirical 
studies, after covering for subsistence needs, households prefer to smooth or accumulate assets 
rather than increase consumption. Similar results were obtained by Chen et al (2006) for micro 
credit programs in China. Despite these positive results, the coefficient for participation in 
income generation programs looses significance after instrumentalizing it.   
Vulnerable households are less able to recover from asset loss. Male headed households fare 
better during the recovery process; as we move up the quartiles, the significance of a household 
being male-headed with respect to asset recovery increases. The estimations that include only 
vulnerability variables show a large and significant positive effect of having a male household 
head (COP$1.5 millions – US$694). However, once other controls are incorporated in the 
estimation, the size of the coefficient reduces. Presumably, female headed households exhibit 
particular vulnerable characteristics that reduce asset accumulation. After controlling for these 
characteristics, the impact of being male headed household decreases (COP$1 million – 
US$462).  On the other hand, asset accumulation seems indeed difficult for ethnic minorities. 
Ethnic minorities face poor conditions at destination sites because their connections with their 
cultural heritage and social networks are broken; some groups have difficulties speaking in 
Spanish, and thus have less access to government programs. For them, income barely covers 
subsistence needs. Thus, asset holdings for ethnic minorities is COP$2.0 million (US$925) lower. 
This result is robust to different specification and persists even after controlling for other 
characteristics.  
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Length of settlement – days  5.9849 
(13.52)*** 
5.0295 





Length of settlement squared  -0.0005 
(-7.28)*** 
-0.0004 
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Department controls  No  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations  2332 2331 2319 2318 2321 2320 2319 2318 
R-squared  0.1052 0.1851 0.0536 0.1612 0.0256 0.1337 0.1343 0.2067 
Controls for municipality size are included (country capital, large city, and medium size city) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
*Significant at 10%**Significant at 5%***Significant at 1%   48
Table 5b. Determinants of asset accumulation 




























































































































































































Department controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2162 2162 2318 2318 2318 
R-squared  0.0665  0.2027 0.007 0.0824  0.2429 
Controls for municipality size are included (country capital, large city, and medium size city) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004).   49
*Significant at 10%. 
**Significant at 5%. 
***Significant at 1%   50
The displacement shock is certainly large. Conflict and forced migration bring about a 
depletion of physical, financial, human, and social capital. The erosion of a household’s 
asset base, coupled with restricted access to labor markets, pushes a displaced 
household into an extremely vulnerable situation and hinders asset accumulation, thus, 
imposing high long-term costs which are not easily overcome. Notably, these 
consequences persist through time, as an insufficient asset base traps households in 
chronic poverty. Indeed, only a small group of households appear to initiate a moderate 
accumulation of assets. Moreover, the conflict induced shock is not overcome easily 
once in destination sites. The extent of asset accumulation for displaced households is 
strongly related to the conditions required for successful productive activities—a longer 
period of settlement at destination sites, access to credits, to employment, and a less 
vulnerable household structure. However, since the asset loss due to displacement is 
substantial, households will not be able to engage in virtuous cycles of asset 
accumulation unless they are supported by special social and government programs 
such as seek to promote income generating programs, along with asset recovery or 
protection. Our results show that income generating programs, coupled with other 
conditions, are crucial in inducing households to initiate a process of asset recovery.  
However, the efforts seem still insufficient. For example, asset losses for a household 
that reactively displaced and faced the dead of the main breadwinner is COP$10.2 
million (US$4722) higher than for other households. On the other hand, none of the 
variables determining asset accumulation in destination sites is able to offset this effect. 
Having an employed head and participating in income generation programs increases 
asset holdings in destination sites by COP$3.2 million (US$1481).   
4. Conclusions 
A conflict-induced shock imposes heavy asset losses upon a group of victims, in this 
case, a displaced population. When forcibly displaced, households leave behind 
physical capital, such as housing and land, cease to derive returns from their land, and 
are unable to recoup investments made in land improvement. Informal and formal risk-
sharing mechanisms weaken as a consequence of migration; access to credit markets, 
both formal and informal, declines; links with social networks and formal organizations 
wither; and alternative saving mechanisms, such as livestock, are destroyed or 
abandoned. In addition, human capital depreciates greatly as agricultural abilities are 
not highly valued in urban labor markets. Besides the erosion of all kinds of capital, the   51
displaced population faces enormous obstacles to entering urban labor markets given 
their restricted capacity to compete, and the fact that labor markets in urban areas are 
often tight. Consequently, recovering or accumulating new assets is a rare event—only 
25 percent of households are able to recover assets. In any event, asset ownership seems 
insufficient by itself for overcoming poverty.  
The nature of the conflict-related events that lead to forced displacement and its 
consequences strongly determine the magnitude of the asset loss. Armed groups 
strategically target some households in order to seize valuable assets, to terrorize the 
civilian population, or to weaken the support of their opponent. Consequently, better-off 
households with larger asset holdings or who are closely connected to social networks 
pose attractive targets for achieving these objectives. Because asset holdings prior to 
displacement are large and the consequences of the attacks are often extremely costly 
(e.g., as with the death of main breadwinners), these households suffer substantial asset 
loss. On the other hand, households with a less traumatic victimization profile or which 
migrate preventively fearing an escalation of the conflict tend to face less severe asset 
loss, and are thus better able to cope with displacement shock.  
Regardless of the extent of asset loss caused by forced migration, all displaced 
households are left with an asset base seemingly insufficient to escape poverty. 
Furthermore, displaced persons cannot be assimilated as traditional migrants. Results 
show that displaced households do not catch up even after consolidating settlement at 
destination sites; therefore, time is not an ally in terms of improving these households’ 
conditions. Unless a positive intervention is undertaken, displaced households become 
locked into a low-level economic trajectory; once that happens, leaping forward into a 
high-return asset level becomes highly unlikely. In this respect, forced displacement has 
generated a poverty trap for segments of the Colombian population. The results of this 
study also indicate that asset accumulation and recovery from shocks does not occur 
naturally on account of the poor initial conditions—that is, a lack of assets, restricted 
access to financial markets, and soaring unemployment. Targeted assistance, such as 
asset transfers and protections against shocks, is needed to stimulate growth.  
Moreover, our results reveal that income generating programs indeed help to spur asset 
recovery and accumulation. Beneficiaries of income generating programs experience 
larger recoveries of assets. By connecting households to better quality jobs and   52
providing seed capital for implementing productive activities, income generating 
programs expand earnings, which then are allotted to cover subsistence needs as well as 
accumulate assets. Although the asset recovery of beneficiaries is larger, these programs 
are not effective in increasing consumption, and thus preventing households from   
having to resort to costly strategies in order to smooth consumption (Ibáñez and Moya, 
2006a). Households appear to prefer accumulating assets rather than expanding 
consumption, presumably as a precautionary response and because of the high 
uncertainty regarding the long-term impact of the program. in order to pursue this 
strategy, households adopt strategies which may entail long-term costs—school 
interruption, low levels of consumption, child labor, and household fragmentation. 
Supplementing income generating programs with other benefits, like nutritional 
programs or conditioned cash-transfers, may enable households to accumulate while 
avoiding adopting costly strategies.  
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Annex: First stage regressions for instrumental variable regressions  
 
Table A.1. First stage: intramunicipal displacement 
Variables Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Reactive displacement  0.0231 
(1.15) 
Hh head dead or left  -0.0731 
(-2.96)*** 
Perception presence: illegal armed groups  -0.0229 
(-1.00) 
Perception presence: government forces  -0.0955 
(-5.51)*** 
HH average number of organizations  0.0289 
(2.88)*** 
Formal land title  0.0442 
(2.09)** 




Total hectares of land  -0.0003 
(-2.05)* 
Years of schooling – household head  -0.0026 
(-0.78) 
Number of persons between 12 and 17  0.0085 
(1.21) 
Number of persons between 17 and 65  0.0042 
(0.80) 
Ethnic minority  0.0405 
(2.12)** 
Contacts in destination  0.0636 
(4.18)*** 
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Department controls  No  Yes 
Observations 2162  2162 
R-squared 0.2275  0.292 
Controls for urbanization structure are included. These include country capital, large city, medium size 
city and small city 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENHD (2004). 
*Significant at 10%. 
**Significant at 5%. 
***Significant at 1% 